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DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF THE BOARD
OF ZONING APPEALS
JoHN W. REPs*
The adoption of the first comprehensive zoning regulations by New York City
in 1916 began a new era in public regulation of private property. It also resulted
in the creation of an agency new to local government-the board of zoning appeals,
an administrative tribunal with quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers. Under
the influence of the New York experience and stimulated by the preparation in x922
of the model Standard State Zoning Enabling Act' by the United States Department
of Commerce, state legislatures throughout the country soon enacted enabling legis-
lation for zoning. Virtually all of these statutes provided for a board of appeals
with three main functions. The Standard Act, followed closely by a majority
of the states, specified the powers of the board in these words :2
i. To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged there is error in any order, require-
ment, decision, or determination made by an administrative official in the enforcement
of this act or of any ordinance adopted pursuant thereto.
2. To hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance upon which
such board is required to pass under such ordinance.
3. To authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance from the terms of the
ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where, owing to special conditions,
a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hard-
ship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done.
The first of the powers-review of administrative action and interpretation of
ordinance provisions-has not been the source of widespread difficulties. In an
appeal of this type the board does not exercise discretionary authority; instead, the
board must act as if it were the administrative official to which the original permit
application was submitted.
The real problems arise from the separate but related powers of the board to grant
variances and special exceptions. The differences between the two should be clear
enough, but they are often confused by boards of appeals and occasionally by the
courts. This confusion is compounded by the practice in some states of requesting
both types of permits in a single appeal.
Briefly, a variance is a permit granted by the board of appeals where it finds
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the applicant suffering unnecessary hardship because of special conditions. A
special exception permit is for a use identified in the ordinance but which can be
authorized only by action of the board.'
I
THE BoARD oF APPEALs: SAFETY VALVE OR LEAK IN THE BOILER?
Probably no other figure of speech has been so overworked as the comparison
of the board of appeals to a "safety valve," designed to prevent some legal ex-
plosion. In the early days of zoning this was often mentioned as the main reason
for the existence of the board.5 If early appeals boards were not actually encouraged
to grant appeals liberally, they at least were not unduly restrained from doing so in
doubtful cases with this attitude as the prevailing philosophy.
It is true that the explosion has not occurred, but there is plenty of evidence also
that there isn't much steam left in the boiler. As one experienced observer has
commented,6
Every improperly granted special permit, every adjustment, which is in effect an in-
stance of spot zoning, is a leak in the zoning ordinance. And it doesn't take very many
such leaks to exhaust the strength of the zoning plan. Even if the excess densities, or
the fudging on yard and area requirements or, mayhap, the change of use, permitted
by improper actions of the board of appeals do not greatly affect the broad land use
and density pattern (if any) of the master plan, they do start a disintegration of the
zoning plan, and they do undermine confidence in its integrity.
No comprehensive survey has been made of the activities of zoning boards of
appeals, but enough comparative information exists to show the alarming number
of appeals granted in many of our cities. While mere numbers are not proof of
improper action they are certainly grounds for suspicion. In Cincinnati from 1926
through 1937, the board of appeals granted 1,493 variances out of 1,94o requests. In
Cleveland from 1929 through 1937, 1,289 out of 2,307 variance requests were granted.
In Denver from 1925 through 1937 there were 1,516 variance applications, of which
893 were granted. In Philadelphia during the period 1933-1937 the board of ad-
justment granted 4,000 appeals out of 4,8oo cases appearing before the boardV
More recent data show the number of variances approved in twenty cities during
1946. For example, in Austin out of 358 applications, 240 were granted; in Mil-
" For cases distinguishing between variances and exceptions, see Mitchell Land Co. v. Planning and
Zoning Board, 140 Conn. 527, b02 A.2d 36 (1953); Stone v. Cray, 89 N.H. 483, 20o At. 517 (1938);
Dunham v. Zoning Board of Town of Westerly, 68 RI. 88, 26 A.2d 614 (1942); Application of Dev-
ereux Foundation, 351 Pa. 478, 41 A.2d 744 (1945); Hickox v. Griffin, 298 N.Y. 365, 83 N.E.2d 836
(1949); Carson v. Board of Appeals of Lexington, 321 Mass. 649, 75 N.E.2d ix6 (1947).
'For example, see Baker, The Zoning Board of Appeals, 1o MINN. L. REv. 277, 280 (1926): "The
chief value of the board of appeals in zoning is in protecting the ordinance from attacks upon its con-
stitutionality."
' Pomeroy, Losing the Eflectiveness of Zoning Through Leakage, Planning and Civic Comment, Oct.
'941, pp. 8-9.
'AmEwICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, ZONING CHANGES AND VARIANCES, BuLL. No. 43 (April,
1938).
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waukee 121 out of 163; in Pasadena 475 out of 586; in Rochester 230 out Of 325.8
Another source reveals that in Chicago from 1923 to 1953, the board of appeals
granted 4,26o variances, and more than half of these were awarded since the com-
prehensive zoning amendment in 1942.'
Whether through ignorance of the law, political influence, the belief that mistakes
in legislation can be cured through administrative relief, or magnification of power
for purposes of prestige, the board of appeals in many cities has become a device of
danger rather than safety. Certainly the granting of unjustified permits is one of
the causes of urban blight and decay in existing neighborhoods.'0 Granting of
only a few unwarranted permits in undeveloped areas, may also prevent sound
growth at the city's fringe. Land acquisition costs for community improvements
may be increased by inflation of condemnation awards which take into account more
intensive uses allowed by improper permits." Moreover, since these special per-
mits do not appear on the zoning map, it is difficult for the average citizen to know
exactly what land use regulations are operative in his neighborhood. This "hidden
zoning" is unfair and will eventually undermine confidence in the protection that
zoning is supposed to bring. Undeserved permits to which the board has attached
conditions also mean additional administrative costs if essential periodic inspections
are made to see that the conditions are being upheld.' 2 Finally, the use of zoning
as a positive and thus necessarily strict measure to aid in comprehensive city re-
planning is impossible if the board of appeals constantly creates new problems of
land use.'
II
Ti PowER To IssuE VARIANCES IN CASES OF HARDSHIP
What is the extent and what are the limitations of the variance power? It is
obviously impossible to provide an answer valid in every state. What the writer
has attempted is the statement of a thesis buttressed by decisions selected for the
most part from a few eastern states.
The fundamental requirements for a variance are succinctly stated in the often
cited opinion in Otto v. Steinhilber:"4
'Administration of Zoning Variances in 2o Cities, 30 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 70 (1948); See also
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, MEASURES oF VARIANCE ArvrTV, PLANNING ADVISORY
SERVICE INFORMATION REP. No. 6o (1954).
'Comment, Zoning Amendments and Variations and Neighborhood Decline in Illinois, 48 N. W. L.
Pv. 470, 48r (I953).
'
0 lbid. "Moyerman v. Koons, 8o Pa. D. & C. 63 (C.P. 1952).
"In Mitchell Land Co. v. Planning and Zoning Board of Appeals, supra note 4, five of the nine
conditions specified would require almost daily inspection. For cases dealing with the legality of condi-
tional permits, see Reps, Legal and Administrative Aspects of Conditional Zoning Variances and Excep-
tions, 2 SYRAcusE L. REV. 54 (950).
"Ready v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Milford, 139 Conn. 463, 467, 94 A.2d 789, 79x (953):
. unless great caution is used and variations are granted only in proper cases, the whole fabric of
town- and city-wide zoning will be worn through in spots and raveled at the edges until its purpose
in protecting property values and securing an orderly development of the community is completely
thwarted."
"4282 N.Y. 71, 76, 24 N.E.2d851, 853 (1939),rehearing denied, 282 N.Y. 68x, 26N.E.2d 8ix (194o).
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Before the Board may exercise its discretion and grant a variance upon the ground
of unnecessary hardship, the record must show that (i) the land in question cannot
yield a reasonable return if used only for a purpose allowed in that zone; (2) that the
plight of the owner is due to unique circumstances and not to the general conditions in
the neighborhood which may reflect the unreasonableness of the zoning ordinance itself;
and (3) that the use to be authorized by the variance will not alter the essential character
of the locality.
These three basic requirements for a proper variance will be examined in more
detail.
i. There must be proof of hardship.
(a) There must be proof of inability to make reasonable use of the property for
a purpose or in a manner authorized by the zoning ordinance. The New Jersey
Supreme Court stated its rule for determining hardship in Beirn v. Morris:15
The inquiry is whether the use restriction, viewing the property in the setting of its
environment, is so unreasonable as to be confiscatory.
In Devaney v. Board of Zoning Appeals of New Haven,0 the Connecticut court de-
fines conditions of hardship as
• . . situations where the application of zoning to a particular property greatly de-
creases or practically destroys its value for any permitted use and the application of the
ordinance bears so little relationship to the purposes of zoning that, as to that property,
the regulation is in effect confiscatory or arbitrary....
And in Calcagno v. Town Board of Webster,'7 there was a similar ruling:
The petitioners, in order to become entitled to a variance, must show factors sufficient
to constitute such a hardship as would in effect deprive them of their property without
compensation.
See also: Application of Devereux Foundation, 351 Pa. 478, 484, 485, 41 A.2d 744, 747 (1945): "Mere
hardship is not sufficient; there must be unnecessary hardship. . . . Moreover, the power given by the
statute and by the ordinance to authorize a variance is limited by the provision that it must be such
'as will not be contrary to the public interest' . . ."; Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249,
255, 256, 92 P.2d 724, 727 (1939): "The conditions fixed by statute . . . under which the Board may
grant a variance are: (a) It must not be contrary to the public interest . . . (b) there must be special
conditions, that is, conditions not applying or that would not apply to other lands in the vicinity; (c)
due to said special conditions a literal, that is, rigid or strict enforcement of the provisions of the
building ordinances, must result in unnecessary hardship ... (d) but even with all the foregoing condi-
tions present the spirit of the ordinance must be observed . . ."; and Brackett v. Board of Appeal of
Boston, 311 Mass. %t, 6o, 39 N.E.2d 956, 961 (1942): ". . All relevant factors, when taken together,
must indicate that the plight of the premises in question is unique in that they cannot be put reasonably
to a conforming use because of the limitations imposed upon them by reason of their classification in a
specified zone. When this appears, the further question has to be determined, whether desirable relief
may be granted without substantially derogating from the intent and purpose of the zoning law, but
not otherwise."
1r 14 N.J. 529, o3 A.2d 361, 364 (i954). See also Leimann v. Board of Adjustment, 9 N.J. 336,
342, 88 A.2d 337, 339 (x952): "The statute contemplates proof that the property .. . cannot reasonably
be put to the permitted use.
16 132 Conn. 537, 543, 45 A.2d 828, 830 (946).
17 265 App. Div. 687, 689, 41 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (4 th Dep't 1943), afl'd mem., 291 N.Y. 701, 52
N.E.2d 592 (1943).
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It is not sufficient proof of hardship to show that greater profit would result if
the variance were awarded. In the leading North Carolina decision of Lee v. Board
of Adjustment of Rocky Mount,8 the application was for the establishment of a
grocery store and gasoline station in a residential district. There was no evidence
that the property could not be reasonably devoted to residential purposes, and the
court stated:
It is erroneous to base a conclusion that the denial of an application would work an
unnecessary hardship because the applicant could earn a better income from the type
of building proposed.
This general rule has been adhered to in numerous decisions.'" What facts are
sufficient to demonstrate inability to make reasonable use of the property for a per-
mitted use vary widely from state to state. Detailed analysis of decisions on this
point would be a useful study.20
(b) The hardship complained of cannot be self-created. For example, in Selig-
man v. Von Allmen Brothers"' the owner of a non-conforming milk bottling plant
was ordered to put on a new roof by the health authorities. A permit was obtained
and work started, but it was discovered that the old wooden walls were not
structurally sound. The owner proceeded to construct brick walls without a permit.
When the work was nearly completed the building inspector halted construction, and
a permit was refused on the grounds the new walls constituted structural alterations
of a non-conforming building. The board of appeals refused to issue a variance to
permit completion of the job. The owner maintained he was suffering unnecessary
hardship, but the court held:
* ' .appellee created the situation which it now complains is working the hardship
in that it razed the frame walls and started replacing them with brick under a permit
which allowed it only to repair the roof. It should have sought a variation from the
Board and a permit from the Building Inspector before commencing this work. One
cannot proceed in the face of building restrictions or of zoning laws and then complain
that a great hardship is being imposed upon him when not allowed to complete the
work.
This proposition also seems one that is generally supported in other jurisdictions.2
xs226 N.C. 107, 110, 37 S.E.2d 128, i31 (1946).
'9 See People ex rel. Werner v. Walsh, 212 App. Div. 635, 640, 209 N.Y. Supp. 454, 458 (Ist
Dep't 1925), afi'd, 24o N.Y. 689, 148 N.E. 76o (1925): "The mere fact that a garage is more profitable
than any other structure is not sufficient evidence of hardship"; Thayer v. Board of Appeals, 114 Conn.
15, 22, 157 AtI. 273, 275 (i93i): "Disadvantage in property value or income, or both, to a single
owner of property, resulting from application of zoning restrictions, does not, ordinarily, warrant re-
laxation in his favor on the ground of practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship"; Beirn v. Morris,
supra note 15, 14 N.J. at 534-535, 103 A.2d at 363: ". • profit motive is not an adequate ground for a
variance."
"oFor a comparison of a number of decisions on the nature of proof of hardship, see PILW, P.
GREEN, JR., ZONING IN NoT-m CAROLINA 343-353 (19.5).
21297 Ky. 121, 126, 179 S.W.2d 207, 210 (1944)-
2
'Piccolo v. West Haven, 120 Conn. 449, x8x Ad. 6x5 (1935); National Lumber Products Co. v.
Ponzio, 133 N.J.L. 95, 42 A.2d 753 (1945)-
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(c) Hardship cannot be claimed by one who purchases with knowledge of
restrictions. In Clark v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Hempstead 3 the court in-
validated a variance permitting the use of a residence as a funeral home. The prop-
erty had been purchased a few years previously, and the residential zoning classifica-
tion had remained unchanged. The court ruled:
...one who thus knowingly acquires land for a prohibited use, cannot thereafter
have a variance on the ground of "special hardship."
While other decisions follow this same rule,24 some hold that the fact of purchase
with knowledge of restrictions is not wholly conclusive but merely persuasive in
showing lack of hardship. 5
(d) The hardship must result from the application of the ordinance. The prop-
erty in Brackett v. Board of Appeal of Boston"0 was in a general residence district
where multiple dwellings, clubs, hotels, and other similar uses were permitted. A
restriction in the deed, however, prohibited any building other than a single-family
residence. The owner, a hotel corporation, had requested and was awarded a vari-
ance to use the land as a parking lot. In invalidating the action of the board, the
court observed:
... it would seem that the board had in mind the disadvantage of the corporation
arising from the restriction upon its lot, rather than any disadvantage attributable to the
fact that the premises are zoned in a general residence district. In short, apart from the
fact that the premises in question are restricted to a single family dwelling, there is no
finding that there are any other conditions that render the premises unsuitable for resi-
dential and other uses permissible under the zoning law....
Other decisions in New York and Rhode Island are in accord with this principle!"
(e) The hardship complained of must be suffered directly by the property in
question. Applicants frequently come before boards of appeals arguing that the
lack of their proposed use in the neighborhood constitutes a hardship on the resi-
dents which should be relieved. This argument was rejected in Brackett v. Board
of Appeal of Boston (supra note 26), previously discussed, where it was urged that
provision of a parking lot would help to relieve the "hardship" of traffic congestion
"3 301 N.Y. 86, 92 N.E.2d 903 (i95o).
"' Matter of Henry Steers v. Rembaugh, 259 App. Div. 908, 2o N.Y.S.2d 72 (2d Dep't 1940), afl'd,
284 N.Y. 62x, 29 N.E.2d 934 (1940); Devaney v. Board of Zoning Appeals of New Haven, supra note
16.
"'Coble Close Farm v. Board of Adjustment, io N.J. 442, 92 A.2d 4 (952); Application of
Devereux Foundation, supra note 14; Holy Sepulchre Cemetery v. Board of Appeals of Town of Greece,
27! App. 33, 6o N.Y.S.2d 750 (4th Dep't 1946). See also 293 North Broadway Corp. v. Lange, 282
App. Div. xo56, 126 N.Y.S. 2d 374 (2d Dep't 1953): "Although one who purchases land with knowledge
of a use restriction will not be permitted to claim special hardship .. . that rule does not apply to a
variance of an area restriction."
25 311 Mass, 52, 58, 39 N.E.2d 956, 960 (1942).
ITHickox v. Griffin, 298 N.Y. 365, 83 N.E.2d 836 (1949); Winters v. Zoning Board of Review, 96
A.2d 337, 340 (RT. 1953): ". . . hardship . . .is one resulting from restricted use of petitioner's land
by virtue of the terms of the ordinance, and not personal hardship growing out of petitioner's physical
infirmities."
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in the neighborhood. Similarly, in Young Women's Hebrew Assn v. Board of
Standards and Appeals" the court dismissed the contention that a "hardship" within
the meaning of the zoning law would be relieved by allowing a gasoline station on
one side of a street where no other station existed, so that south-bound traffic would
not be forced to cross to the opposite side of the street to reach an existing station.
2. There must be proof of unique circumstances.
While the existence of hardship may be proved by the applicant, that alone is not
sufficient, since hardship may result from either of two reasons :29
:. . the fault may lie in the fact that the particular zoning restriction is unreasonable in
its application to a certain locality, or the oppressive result may be caused by conditions
peculiar to a particular piece of land.
The board of appeals has authority to grant relief only where the hardship arises out
of special conditions inherent in the property itself. If the hardship is general, that
is, shared by neighboring property, relief can be properly obtained only by legislative
action or by court review of an attack on the validity of the ordinance.
Thus in People ex rel. Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Murdock,a° while the
court was sympathetic to the claim of hardship by an owner who wished to estab-
lish a commercial use in an undeveloped area restricted to residential purposes, re-
fusal of the variance by the board was sustained,
* * * the conditions complained of, and particularly the presence of odors emanating
from an incinerator and a creek used as an outlet for a sewer, are not peculiar to the
site in question, but affect a wide area. . . . Under these circumstances, there was no
showing of unnecessary hardship or practical difficulty applicable peculiarly to the site
in question, and relief, if any, should be achieved through appeal to the legislative
authority which created the zone.
Other decisions in New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Jersey, among
others, have followed this ruling.8
28 266 N.Y. 270, 194 N.E. 751 (935).
2 Otto v. Stenhilber, supra note 14, 282 N.Y. at 75, 24 N.E. at 852.
so247 App. Div. 889, 286 N.Y.Supp. 785, 786 (2d Dep't 1936), afl'd mem., 271 N.Y. 631, 3 N.E.2d
457 (936).
"Levy v. Board of Standards and Appeals, 267 N.Y. 347, 196 N.E. 284 (1935); Young Women's
Hebrew Ass'n v. Board of Standards and Appeals, supra note 28; Ostrove v. Cohen, 269 App. Div.
1054, 58 N.Y.S.2d 9oo (2d Dep't 1945), leave to appeal denied, 270 App. Div. 8x8, 6o N.Y.S.2d
295 (946); Hickox v. Griffin, supra note a7; Brackett v. Board of Appeal of Boston, supra note 26,
311 Mass. at 58, 39 N.E.2d at 960: "If there is a general hardship, this situation may be remedied by
revision of the general regulation, and not by granting a special privilege of a variation to single owners";
Lumund v. Board of Adjustment, 4 N.J. 577, 582-583, 73 A.2d 545, 548 (295o): ". . . a finding of
'unnecessary hardship' to an individual owner, due to 'special conditions' is a sine qua non to the
exercise of the board of adjustment's authority to grant a variance from the terms of the ordinance, and
* * . if the difficulty is common to other lands in the neighborhood so that the application of the
ordinance is general rather than particular, the remedy lies with the local legislative body or in the
judicial process . . ."; Devaney v. Board of Zoning Appeals of New Haven, supra note 16, 132 Conn.
at 541-542, 45 A.2d at 830: ". . . the use of the adjective 'unnecessary' in modification of 'hardships'
* * .can only be related to those hardships which do not follow as the ordinary results of the adoption
of the zoning plan as a whole."
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This principle is of critical importance. Even in those states where opinions
on this point have been most numerous and consistent, there have been occasional
questionable decisions in the highest courts. 2 And in these same states some lower
courts and many boards of appeals consistently ignore the fundamental requirement
of unique circumstances. In other states the highest courts have strangely over-
looked this principle, upholding variance permits on the grounds of hardship in
situations where the alleged hardship was plainly shared by adjacent property3 3
There are convincing reasons why this principle should be followed. As the New
York court has observed, 4
Equality of privileges is a basic principle of government. To cure by exemption in
his case the loss resulting to one owner from general deterioration of a neighborhood is
to depreciate the adjacent properties of other owners, and is unjust also to those whose
properties remain subject to the same restriction in other localities likewise impaired.
Moreover, violation of this concept allowing relief only in exceptional and unique
circumstances would strike at the basic authority of the legislative body to determine
the proper classification of zoning districts. Thus, in invalidating a variance granted
where heavy traffic and general conditions in the vicinity made the location unsuit-
able for a permitted use, the court in Levy v. Board of Standards and Appeals 35
stated:
No power has been conferred . . . to review the legislative general rules regulating the
use of land .... The board does not exercise legislative powers. It may not determine
what restrictions should be imposed upon property in a particular district. It may. not
review the legislative general rules regulating the use of land. It may not amend such
general rules or change the boundaries of the districts where they are applicable. Its
function is primarily administrative. . . . Its power is confined to relief in proper
cases from hardship unnecessarily caused by application of a general restriction to a par-
ticular piece of land. It may not destroy the general restriction by piecemeal exemption
of pieces of land equally subject to the hardship created in the restriction, nor arbitrarily
grant to an individual a special privilege denied to others.
No hard and fast rule can be formulated as to what reviewing courts will regard
as satisfactory proof of unique circumstances. In Hammond v. Board of Appeals, 6
the court decided "with hesitation" that a residence in an area of mixed stores and
homes, located near a number of non-conforming business uses, and incapable of'
" See, for example, the early New York opinion in People ex rel. St. Albans-Springfield Corp. v.
Connell, 257 N.Y. 73, 177 N.E. 313 (1931), where the hardship was clearly general, and the recent
New Jersey case of x65 Augusta Street v. Collins, 9 N.J. 259, 264, 87 A.2d 889, 891 (5952), where
existing business uses in the vicinity and the division of a lot by the zone boundary line were deemed
to constitute an "extraordinary and exceptional situation or condition of the property." Justice Heher's
vigorous dissenting opinion should be carefully studied.
"'Triolo v. Exley, 358 Pa. 555, 57 A.2d 878 (1948); Messenger v. Zoning Board of Review, 99
A.2d 865 (R.I. x953). In both decisions the courts cited conditions of the neighborhood in justifying
the grant of special privilege.
1" Young Women's Hebrew Ass'n v. Board of Standards and Appeals, supra note 28, 266 N.Y. at
276, 194 N.E. at 753.
" Supra note 31, 267 N.Y. at 352-353, 196 N.E. at 286.
a0257 Mass. 446, 154 N.E. 82 (1926).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
being rented as a house, was so uniquely situated as to warrant a variance for its
conversion to a retail store. And in Dooling's Windy Hill, Inc. v. Zoning Board of
Adjustment,"7 the court seemed to rely on such irrelevant matters as the suitability
of the property for its proposed hotel use and the "trend... toward increasing com-
mercialization" of the immediate vicinity.
On the other hand, the New Jersey court now requires compelling proof of
unique circumstances. In Beirn v. Morris,3 8 the property was the first interior lot
north of an acute-angle intersection. Immediately to the north was a fire station.
Adjoining on the south in the apex of the triangle formed by the streets was a gaso-
line station. Another gasoline station was across the street. Real estate experts
testified that the lot was unsuitable for a residence and that few houses had been
erected in the vicinity since the fire station was built twenty years previously. The
court regarded these facts as insufficient evidence of hardship not shared by others.
Further analysis of this point would be a valuable contribution to zoning knowledge.
3. There must be proof that the proposed use would not alter the essential character
of the neighborhood.
The applicant for a variance who is able to prove hardship as well as unique cir-
cumstances must still satisfy a final requirement. The board must find that the
use, if allowed, would not effect a substantial change in the character of the district
or be in conflict with the general intent of the zoning law. The recent decision in
Rexon v. Board of Adjustment of Haddonfield" illustrates this principle. The prop-
erty was in the interior of a block, parts of which were residential. The building
was used for a machine shop that the appellant wished to enlarge substantially.
The courts held the land could reasonably be used for conforming purposes, adding:
Moreover . . . relief is not to be granted . . . unless it may be done without sub-
stantial detriment to the public good and without substantial impairment of the intent and
purpose of the zoning plan. The evidence pointing to a serious threat to the health
and well being of the citizens of this residential community from the continuance of
plaintiff's factory operation fully supports the local board's finding that a variance could
not be granted without substantial detriment to the public good....
Many other decisions in New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York
are in general agreement.40
371 Pa. 290, 295, 89 A.2d 505, 507 (1952).
38 Supra note 15.
zo N.J. 1, 8, 89 A.2d 233, 236 (r952).
SLeimann v. Board of Adjustment, supra note x5; Heady v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Milford,
supra note 13, 139 Conn. at 468, 94 A.2d at 791: "A variance should not be granted unless it is in
harmony with the general purpose and intent of the zoning ordinance"; Prusik v. Board of Appeal
of Boston, 262 Mass. 451, 457, i6o N.E. 312, 34 (1928): "Exceptional circumstances alone justify re-
laxation in peculiar cases of the restrictions imposed by the statute. The dominant design of any
zoning act is to promote the general welfare. . . . The stability of the neighborhood and the pro-
tection of property of others in the vicinity are important considerations"; Holy Sepulchre Cemetery
v. Board of Appeals of Greece, supra note 25, 271 App. Div. at 41-42, 6o N.Y.S.2d at 756: "Assuming
. . . that petitioner did show generally a peculiar situation, not of its own creation, which will result
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In those states adhering to the rule requiring proof of hardship, a showing that
such hardship is due to unique circumstances, and a showing that the relief of the
hardship must not alter the essential character of the locality, a variance allowing
an otherwise prohibited use can rarely be justified. The highest courts in these
states are reluctant to uphold variances except for modifications in yard, height, or
lot area requirements. In another group of states, chiefly in the mid-west, courts
have made a complete prohibition of use variances explicit. In the leading North
Carolina decision the court based this prohibition on the doctrine of maintaining
the spirit of the ordinance:4
No power to convert a residential section into a business district . . . is conferred.
Therefore it cannot permit a type of business or building prohibited by the ordinance,
for to do so would be an amendment of the law and not a variance of its regulations....
As the new building and its use must harmonize with the spirit and purpose of the
ordinance . . . no variance is lawful which does precisely what a change of map would
accomplish.... Action to that effect is in direct conflict with the general purpose and
intent of the ordinance and does violence to its spirit.
And in Nicolai v. Board of Adjustment of Tucson, 2 the Arizona Supreme Court,
citing similar decisions from Utah, Oklahoma, Texas, Missouri, North Dakota, and
Iowa, ruled that use variances were not valid.
III
THE BoARi OF APPEALS AND SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS
Most zoning statutes authorize the board of appeals to grant permits for uses
which are listed in the zoning ordinance and which are not authorized as a matter
of right but only on special permit. These "use permits" (less exactly but more
commonly termed "special exceptions") are intended as an effective method of exer-
cising control over certain exceptional or unusual uses of land and buildings. Spe-
cial exception uses often include sanitariums, hospitals, cemeteries, airports, public
utility structures, and other uses, not likely to occur in great numbers, but potentially
troublesome in their impact on surrounding property, and for which it is difficult
to prepare specific regulations adequate in all cases. Other situations frequently
regulated by the special exception device are extensions or alterations of non-
conforming uses, conversion of old and large single-family houses to apartments,
temporary permits for otherwise prohibited uses in undeveloped areas, and location
of certain types of heavy industry.
Under the Standard Act, and enabling statutes similarly worded, authorization
in unnecessary hardship to it if the ordinance be enforced, still the board was not obligated, on that
score alone, to grant the variance. On the contrary, it was required to balance such hardship against
the equities, namely, to what extent the variance would interfere with the whole zoning plan and the
rights of owners of other property"; Matter of Taxpayers' Association of South East Oceanside v. Board
of Appeals of Hempstead, 301 N.Y. 215, 93 N.E.2d 645 (1950).
," Lee v. Board of Adjustment of Rocky Mount, supra note 18, 226 N.C. at 112, 37 S.E.2d at 132-
133.42 55 Ariz. 283, 101 P.2d 99 (0940).
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for special exceptions is unaccompanied by the qualifying or limiting language
found in provisions authorizing variances. Most statutes simply allow the legislative
body to delegate this power to the board under such conditions and guided by such
standards as are considered appropriate. Generalizations on the scope of board of
appeals authority in granting special exceptions are dangerous, since ordinance pro-
visions vary so widely even among municipalities in a single state. The following
general principles are advanced with some hesitation because of this lack of standard-
ization in the special exceptions sections of existing ordinances.
i. The special exception use must be listed in the ordinance and jurisdiction over it
granted to the board.
In the section of the ordinance specifying the powers of the board, the specific
uses over which it has jurisdiction will usually be listed. In other ordinances these
uses will appear among the list of permitted uses in the sections dealing with district
regulations, and will be accompanied by some statement that the board of appeals
must pass on permit applications for such uses. Only the uses identified in the
ordinance may be permitted as special exceptions.
In at least one state-Rhode Island-many communities follow a different and
disturbing practice. Here, instead of, or in addition to, a list of particular special
exception uses, ordinances frequently contain a grant of authority for the board to,48
. . . approve in any district an application for any use or building deemed by the said
Board to be in harmony with the character of the neighborhood and appropriate to the
uses or buildings permitted in such district.
The results of this practice have been a deluge of applications for exceptions and
a growing lack of certainty that zoning restrictions will not be subverted by arbitrary
action of an administrative board.
2. The board must make findings of fact consistent with ordinance provisions.
Most special exception sections contain some kind of statement intended as a
general guide applying to all listed special exception uses. Typical of one type of
provision is the following clause limiting the grant of an exception to situations,4 4
... when in the judgment of the Board such special exceptions and grants and decisions
shall be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the zone plan ... and will
iot tend to affect adversely the use and development of neighboring properties and the
general neighborhood....
Here it would appear the board must follow one of the rules for variances dis-
cussed previously: namely, that the proposed use would not alter the essential char-
acter of the locality. Note that no showing of hardship is required, nor proof of
unique circumstances-only that the proposed use will not have an "adverse" effect
in the vicinity and will be in "harmony" with the general purposes of the ordinance.
The board must attempt to measure each application by this elastic yardstick.
'
3 Harrison v. Zoning Board of Review of Pawtucket, 74 R.I. 135, 138, 59 A.2d 361, 363 (1948).
" Montgomery County v. Merlands Club, supra note 3, 202 Md. at 283, 96 A.2d at 263-264.
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Another type of special exception provision includes an additional requirement,
more positive in character although not necessarily capable of more precise definition.
In ordinances of this type the board must find that if the proposed use is approved, 45
... the public convenience and welfare will be substantially served....
If this phrase has any real meaning, it adds an additional burden on an administra-
tive body ill-equipped to make intelligent decisions in this area. The determination
of whether or not a proposed use is needed in a particular district surely lies with
the local planning agency. This is a possible modification in the handling of special
exceptions that deserves further investigation.
There is yet another frequently encountered ordinance provision with which the
board must comply. In Matter of Underhill v. Board of Appeals of Oyster Bay, 6
the ordinance provided that
•.. The Board of Appeals may in a specific case after public notice and hearing and
subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards, authorize special exceptions.
The permit was invalidated because the board failed to specify conditions and safe-
guards. Although many ordinances authorize conditions and safeguards, not
all are worded so that they are apparently mandatory. In cases where this point has
been raised, and where the ordinance was similarly phrased, decisions have followed
that above.Y
3. Adequate standards must be specified in the ordinance to guide the board.
Authorization for the board of appeals to grant variances and exceptions is a dele-
gation of legislative power, valid only if accompanied by a standard or rule of con-
duct sufficiently precise to guide the board. The statutory rule of "unnecessary hard-
ship," as a guide for variances, has been generally upheld as adequate. Since statu-
tory authorization for special exceptions is rarely accompanied by any standard or
rule, this must be provided in the ordinance.
In New York special exception provisions containing no standards, even general
ones, have been held unconstitutional.4 There is some doubt about the validity of
general standards. In Matter of Underhill v. Board of Appeals of Oyster Bay,49
the ordinance listed certain exception uses, preceded by a grant of power to the board
to authorize such uses, when in its judgment, the
"Miriam Hospital v. Zoning Board of Providence, 67 R.I. 295, 297, 23 A.2d 19X, 192 (1941). In
this ordinance the clause quoted was made an alternative requirement to a finding that the proposed use
would not be detrimental to the neighborhood.
40 72 N.Y.S.ad 588, afl'd mem., 273 App. Div. 788, 75 N.Y.S.2d 327 (2d Dep't 1947), afl'd mere.,
297 N.Y. 937, 8o N.E.2d 342 (i948). (Italics supplied.)
""Strauss v. Zoning Board of Warwick, 72 R.I. 107, 48 A.2d 349 (1946); Youngs v. Zoning Board
of Appeals of Norwalk, 127 Conn. 715, 17 A.2d 513 (i941).
"s Little v. Young, 82 N.Y.S.2d 909, aft'd, 274 App. Div. ioo5, 85 N.Y.S.ad 41 (ad Dep't 1948),
afl'd, 298 N.Y. 918, 85 N.E.2d 6i (i949); and Concordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller, 3o1 N.Y. i89, 93
N.E.2d 632 (1950).
"o Supra note 46, 72 N.Y.S.2d at 593, 594.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
public convenience and welfare will be substantially served [and] the appropriate use of
neighboring property will not be substantially or permanently injured ...
In holding this an unconstitutional delegation of power, the court said:
The preamble is too general in its terms to be claimed to be any attempt to lay down
any standards . . . a delegation of legislative power to an administrative officer is not
brought within the permissible limits of such delegation by prescribing the public good
as the standard....
However, in the more recent decision in Aloe v. Dassler the ordinance author-
ized the board to permit certain listed uses,
. . . after taking into consideration the public health, safety and general welfare and
subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards.
This provision was sustained by the court:
The provisions of the zoning ordinance under review confer no power on the Board of
Appeals which may not be lawfully delegated to an administrative body. Standards are
provided which, though stated in general terms are capable of a reasonable application
and are sufficient to limit and define the Board's discretionary powers.
In Sellors v. Town of Concord,6- the Massachusetts court similarly sustained a
general standard in an ordinance authorizing listed exceptions if the board found
"that such use is not detrimental or injurious to the neighborhood."
The Rhode Island court also accepts standards written in general terms, but
apparently requires a more affirmative rule that the proposed exception use is needed
in the neighborhood. In Flynn v. Zoning Board of Review of Pawtuclket,5 2 the
ordinance permitted the board to
* . . approve in any district an application for any use or building deemed by the said
Board to be in harmony with the character of the neighborhood and appropriate to the
uses or building permitted in such district.
For the first time in that state an attack was made on the validity of such a sweeping
delegation of legislative power. The court refused to uphold the ordinance, ob-
serving:
By virtue of this provision the council purported to authorize the board not only to
exercise its discretion on any application for exception but also empowered the board
to fix the limits of that discretion as it deemed desirable in accordance with its own un-
disclosed standards and unqualified judgment.
The following year the same court, in Woodbury v. Zoning Board of Warwick, "
reviewed an ordinance authorizing unspecified exceptions,
G 278 App. Div. 975, lo6 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (2d Dep't 195), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 878, xo5 N.E.2d
104 (1952).
52 329 Mass. 259, 261, 107 N.E.2d 784, 785 (1952).
r2 77 RI. 118, 123, 125, 73 A.2d 8o8, 81I, 812 (ig5o).
Ga78 RI. 319, 321, 82 A.2d 164, x65, 167 (1951).
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. . . where the exception is reasonably necessary for the convenience and welfare
of the public.
The ruling in the Flynn case was held inapplicable because the legislative body,
*. . fixed a limitation upon the exercise of the board's discretion and did not give it
absolute power to act. Such limitation was that a special exception could be made only
when the board found that it was reasonably necessary for the convenience and welfare
of the public.
These decisions, and those in other states, make it clear that standards must be
specified in the ordinance and must be capable of reasonable interpretation.' A
fruitful line of inquiry would be an exploration of the limits of acceptability of
standards written in general terms.
IV
LEGISLATIVE VARIANCES AND EXCEPTIONS
No treatment of the board of appeals would be complete without some dis-
cussion of "legislative" variances or exceptions-applications which are reviewed by
the board but which require legislative confirmation before they are effective. This
device has been used in several states, including California where the statute failed
to provide for a board of appeals, and Illinois after the decision in Welton v. Ham-
ilton" rendered invalid the standard of "unnecessary hardship" for variances. In
New Jersey the 1928 legislation provided for legislative variances in the case of pro-
posed uses more than 150 feet from a district in which such a use was permitted. In
Brandon v. Montclair,5 the New Jersey court ruled that a showing of hardship
was necessary for a variance of this type.
In 1948 the board of appeals section of the New Jersey statutes was amended, and
legislative variances were authorized in any district "in particular cases and for
special reasons" where relief "can be granted without substantial detriment to the
public good" and where the action "will not substantially impair the intent and
purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance."5 7 A series of recent cases have
interpreted this statute, which to some appears an open invitation to seekers of
special privilege.
58
In Monmouth Lumber Co. v. Ocean Township," the court held no proof of un-
necessary hardship was required for a permit of this type. In Schmidt v. Board of
Adjustment, 0 the court pointed out that the statute need not have standards to
guide the board if the legislative body reserved final authority.
"
4 See RALPH CROLLY, THE NECEssiTY FOR ADEQUATE STANDARDS FOR BOARDs OF ZONING APPEALS
IN SPECIAL E EPTnoN CASES (N. Y. REGIONAL PLAN Ass'N, 1949).
s344 Ill. 82, 176 N.E. 333 (1931)-
Go 124 N.J.L. 135, 1I A.2d 304, a)'d, 125 N.J.L. 67, 15 A.2d 598 (1940).
"'N. J. Riv. STAT. §4o:55-39d (Cum. Supp. 1953).
" For a brief critical analysis of the statute and decisions before 1952, see Stickel, A Review of
Powers and Functions of the Board of Adjustment in the Light of Recent Court Decisions, New Jersey
Municipalities, June, x952, p. 7-
rD 9 N.J. 64, 87 A.2d 9 (1952). Go9 N.J. 405, 88 A.2d 607 (952).
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In Ward v. Scott,61 the statute was assailed as an unconstitutional delegation of
power to an administrative agency on the ground that since the standard of hard-
ship did not govern there was no clear rule to guide the board. The court held
that proper standards were provided by the statement of purposes of zoning in the
statute's preamble and by the negative requirement that the proposed use must not
substantially impair the intent and purpose of the ordinance. The dissenting opinion,
however, should be noted:
... unless the recommendatory relief procedure ... be confined to cases of undue hard-'
ship inherent in the particular lot.., or to permissible special uses prescribed by ordinance
according to certain and definite standards of conduct . . . the measure is assailable as
purporting to delegate power that is at once arbitrary and an invasion of the legislative
domain.
Whatever may be the rule of law, the wisdom of this type of variance or exception
procedure is questionable. It almost hopelessly confuses the differences between
legislative and executive functions. It increases the time necessary for a final de-
cision, and it is unnecessarily confusing to the citizen. Perhaps most undesirable
of all, the granting of variances is removed from the jurisdiction of a specialized,
non-partisan body and placed in the hands of a politically motivated, often unin-
formed, and frequently overworked council. A technique better calculated to destroy
the beneficial effects of sound zoning could scarcely be devised.
V
CONTROL OF THE BOARD OF APPEALS
Although the past twenty years has seen some general agreement on the proper
scope of board of appeals powers at the highest judicial levels, let no one think that
all is well. Thousands of board decisions are made each month. A very high per-
centage of them would not survive review by even the most tolerant court. But
it is only in flagrant cases of abuse of authority-and then only if the financial stakes
are sufficiently large-that decisions are taken to any court. The large number of
reversed decisions at the appellate level is proof enough also that many lower courts
have only the vaguest understanding of or sympathy for the law in this field. And
in some states the rulings of even the highest courts are difficult to understand.
Fortunately, there are some remedies. If no one or combination of these seems
likely to transform the board of appeals into a model administrative tribunal, they
should at least help to eliminate some of the features that have made our appeals
boards the shame of our cities.
i. Statutes and ordinances should specify clearly the separate powers of the board.
The Standard Act satisfies this suggestion, but in some states, like New York, the
statutes hopelessly jumble the powers of the board so that a lay member has no
61 Ir N.J. 17, 134, 93 A.2d 385, 393 (1952). See also Ward v. Scott, x6 N.J. x6, 1o5 A.2d 85x
(1954).
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clear understanding of the limits of authority.62 Too many ordinances simply re-
peat or paraphrase the wording of the statute. Simple and unambiguous phraseology
should at least serve to distinguish variances from exceptions and indicate generally
the grounds on which they may be granted.
2. Rules of procedure should be required. If the drafting of rules of procedure
were required, instead of being made optional, the board would be forced at least
once to consider the procedure for hearing appeals, the nature of the evidence re-
quired, and the basis for reaching decisions. These rules should be given wide dis-
tribution, and such groups as the local bar association, a citizens' planning council,
and neighborhood associations should be given an opportunity to examine and crit-
icize them.
3. The board should adopt administrative forms that focus attention on the
proper requirements for variances and exceptions. Forms on which appeals to the
board are made should provide more than the usual spaces to record the name and
address of the appellant, the variance or exception requested, and the reasons for the
appeal. The applicant applying for a variance should be required to state why he
is suffering a hardship, why he believes the hardship is unique, and why the vari-
ance would not alter the character of the neighborhood. Similarly, the form on
which the board records its decision should require a statement of the findings under
those same three headings. This single administrative device should reduce con-
fusion, eliminate irrelevant lines of inquiry, and force both the applicant and the
board to consider only the essential issues.63
4. Maps showing the location of variances and exceptions should be mandatory.
The cumulative damage done to the municipal zoning plan is little understood by
most boards, immersed as they are in the regular flood of applications to be con-
sidered each week or month. Maps indicating the location of every special permit
would be a constant reminder of the effect of their actions and might exercise a re-
straining influence. Boards might also begin to understand that a concentration
of variance symbols on the map in one area perhaps indicates conditions of general
hardship, a situation which they have no power to relieve. And if separate symbols
were used to show all permits issued with conditions attached, the board might
begin to consider both the administrative difficulties and administrative costs which
these actions have created.
5. Jurisdiction over special'exception uses requiring a showing of community need
should be given to the planning board. It is difficult to see why the board of appeals
should be required to hear applications for these types of uses when it lacks the staff
resources, the experience, and the understanding necessary for intelligent decisions.
Discretionary authority for this type of exception should be given to the planning
board.
0" See, for example, N. Y. TowN LAw Art. x6, §267 (2952).
" Hoover, Local Governments Try New Zoning Forms, American City, Nov. 1951, p. 124: BROOME
COUNTY PLANNING BOARD, FORMS FOR ZONING ADMINISTRATION.
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6. Use variances should be prohibited. Since under the rule of hardship, unique
circumstances, and preservation of neighborhood character use variances can be
justified only in extremely rare situations, it might be wise by statute to prohibit
them altogether. This is a drastic measure but one not without precedent.0 4
7. Legislative variances should be eliminated. No useful purpose is served by
legislative review of board decisions. For reasons previously stated, this type of
procedure should be purged from the statutes.
8. The lay board of appeals should be replaced by a board of experts or by a single
zoning appeals administrator. The concept of the board of appeals as a kind of
poor man's court where common sense justice is dispensed by one's friends and neigh-
bors no longer has much validity. With zoning ordinances increasing in complexity
and detail and with the growing demands for more positive zoning as an aid to
vigorous community planning and urban renewal, zoning appeals should be reviewed
by those qualified through professional training or experience. There may be com-
pelling arguments for retaining the board form in our zoning appeals organization,
but we have had experience in other fields with appeals to a single administrator, and
some examples also exist in zoning. The difficulties in the selection of an expert
board or administrator should not prove insurmountable, and the potential benefits
may well outweigh possible dangers. Our statutes should at least make possible
the use of a single administrator as an alternative to the traditional board, and we
should begin to reconsider the methods of selection of board members should we
elect to retain the existing form of organization.
9. The general standard of "unnecessary hardship" might be replaced by more
specific rules. Twenty years ago Alfred Bettman suggested that,",
... experience ought sooner or later to disclose typical and recurrent situations for which
more definite rules could be formulated to govern the board's necessary, though danger-
ous, power of allowing variances from the standards set forth in the zoning ordinance.
Surely by now we have had sufficient experience to prepare more specific rules and
to describe in more detail the types of hardship situations over which the board
should have jurisdiction. In effect this would mean abandoning the idea of vari-
ances entirely and increasing the scope of special exception jurisdiction by defining




The discretionary powers of the board of appeals, while of considerable scope,
are not limitless. The decisions of the past twenty years have been increasingly re-
"4 N.J. REv. STAT. §40:55-39c (1948), as amended in 1953.
" EDWARD M. BASSETT, FRANK B. WILLIAmS, ALFRED BErrMAN, AND ROBERT WHITTEN, MODEL LAws
FOR PLANNING CITIES, COUNTIES, AND STATES (HARVARD CITY PLANNING STUDIES, VII) 64-65 (1935).
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strictive, and one might almost begin to hope that the hundreds of boards throughout
the country, now so generous with their special favors, would begin to absorb the
basic principles laid down at the highest judicial levels. The variance requirements
for a showing of genuine hardship, unique circumstances, and compatibility with
neighborhood character have become generally accepted by our courts. Requirements
for valid special exceptions cannot be so precisely stated, and in this area of juris-
diction there are perhaps questionable tendencies for courts to sustain broad and ill-
defined grants of legislative power. The problem of educating our boards of appeals
to their responsibilities and limitations still remains. If this goal can be achieved, one
of the obstructions to good zoning will have been removed.
